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Abstract. It has been claimed that to fully understand the law, one must know
the language of normative texts and the relevant rules governing its use. It usu-
ally means that normative texts do not seem to be comprehensible enough to
persons without formal legal training. In an on-going research project, we are
focusing on the process of writing texts of legal regulations, conducting semi-
structured interviews with those involved in drafting normative texts. In this
paper, we focus on lawyers as a speech community of legal language speakers
and we discuss why and to what extent this speech community may be con-
sidered an elite in a society. We show that competent usage of special – legal
– language in regulating the whole society may help create a special group of
persons wielding an important segment of cultural capital: the knowledge of le-
gal language, and, in consequence, competent knowledge of law. Given the fact
that this language is used to exercise (legal) power in a society, lawyers appear
to be in the advantageous position of an elite. We argue that those who draft
new legal texts reproduce writing rules and customs, constantly re-creating legal
language as a language mostly incomprehensible to a non-competent speaker,
and, in consequence, creating lawyers as an elite speech community.
Keywords: law, law-making, legal language, cultural capital, Bourdieu, elite.
Introduction
It has been claimed “that a democratic method of making legislation is
better than non-democratic methods in three ways: strategically, epistem-
ically and via the improvement of the characters of democratic citizens”
(Christiano, 2018). It works with a simple definition of democracy, claiming
that the term “refers very generally to a method of group decision making
characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential
stage of the collective decision making” (Christiano, 2018). Yet should we
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claim that a democratic method of making legislation is the best possible
based on the presumption of equality among the participants of such pro-
cess, there has to be such equality present. But what if law-making is an
unequal, and thus non-democratic process because of the inequality of law
itself (or legal language at least)?
It has been claimed that to fully understand law,1 one must know the
language of normative texts (i.e. the language in which the normative texts
are written) and the relevant rules governing its use. It usually means that
normative texts are not seen to be sufficiently comprehensible to persons
without formal legal training.
In an on-going research project,2 we are focusing on the process of writ-
ing texts of legal regulations, conducting structured interviews with those
involved in drafting normative texts. In these interviews, when talking about
issues related to formulation, choice of words and the structuring of norma-
tive texts, we have consistently been given an answer along the lines of “that
is just how it is done”. Yet when asked further about the source of these
“perceived rules”, the interviewees could not really point to any specific
drafting rules, or if they did, the actual rules were in fact not as strict and
as clear as they made them out to be. These answers sound suspiciously like
the answer a speaker of any language would give about the grammatical
rules of their own language: a competent speaker usually knows what is the
right way to say something, yet they are usually not able to explain the
grammatical rules they employ in everyday speech.
Ultimately, the texts of legal regulations – the texts of normative na-
ture – are seemingly written in a language in which previous legal regula-
tions were written and they follow rules these drafters were taught. There-
fore, is it possible that what is being passed on in training a legislation
drafter becomes learned ignorance, the knowledge that Bourdieu describes
as “a mode of practical knowledge not comprising knowledge of its own prin-
ciples” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 19)? If so, does legislation drafting unconsciously
and inadvertently secure the position of legal language speakers as an elite,
wielding a special type of power, the power to use law in a competent way?
In this paper, we focus on lawyers as a speech community formed out
of legal language speakers, and especially out of speakers competent in the
language of normative texts, and we discuss why and to what extent may
this speech community be considered an elite in a society. We show that
competent usage of special – legal – language in regulating the whole soci-
ety may help create a special group of persons wielding an important part
of cultural capital: the knowledge of legal language, and in consequence,
competent knowledge of law. Given the fact that this language is used to
48 Brought to you by | Masaryk University Brno
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/17/20 8:59 AM
Law for elites
exercise (legal) power in a society, lawyers appear to be in the advantageous
position of an elite.
In this paper, we focus solely on written normative texts and on the
language used to draft them. Based on data gathered from interviews we
conducted for the research, we show that those who draft new legal texts
reproduce writing rules and customs, constantly re-creating legal language
as a language incomprehensible to non-competent speakers and, in conse-
quence, creating lawyers as a closed elite speech community.
Legal speech community
Even though legal language – the language of normative texts, judicial
or administrative decisions and legal writing and discourse in general –
is not generally considered a language in the same way that English or
French is, it is still a code of no little importance in the establishment and
communication of basic regulatory principles in a society. It is generally
considered to be a functional variant (Mattila, 2006, p. 3) or style (Čechová,
Krčmová, & Minářová, 1995; Kořenský, 1995) of a given natural language;
a language for special purposes.
Language for special purposes is usually delineated through the func-
tions it needs to perform. First and foremost the function that legal language
performs is the establishment of legal rules: written legal regulation (consti-
tution, statutory laws, secondary legislation) are a means of promulgation
of legal rules, through which those legal rules come into being. It is also
a means for the communication of law: our contemporary legal systems of
states that call themselves democratic and who adhere to the rule of law are
built around the principle of ignorantia iuris neminem excusat. The means
of promulgation of law is also the most prominent means of actual com-
munication of law to its addressees by the state. The language to perform
these two functions seem to be tasked to fulfil two contradictory require-
ments: it needs to be precise enough to guarantee legal certainty and it
needs to be simple enough to guarantee its understandability to those who
are required to act upon it. However, the more precise a language gets, the
more complex it gets and the less understandable it becomes. This contra-
dictory situation – this paradox of legal language (Holländer, 1995; Myška,
Smejkalová, Šavelka & Škop, 2012) – is at the core of all considerations
surrounding the issues of understandability and comprehensibility of law.
But legal language does not serve only to constitute and communicate law.
It also expresses judicial decisions and provides a common code for legal
practitioners to converse in.
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And these are not the only functions the legal language is to fulfil.
Mattila names several others that partially overlap with the above (Mattila,
2006, p. 31). Not only is legal language a code in which to transmit legal
messages, legal language is a means to achieve justice and produce effects –
law aims to regulate human behaviour through the rules expressed in legal
language. In this sense legal language has a performative function – reality is
being changed through words (Austin, 1962). Legal language is also a means
of “reinforcing the team spirit of the legal profession” (Mattila, 2006, p. 31)
and through legal language policy goals are achieved (Mattila, 2006, p. 31).
It follows from the above that to achieve all these functions there might
be some differentiations across legal language and that it is not a homogenic
code: the language (terminology, syntax and style) of normative texts will
differ from the language of judicial decisions, and the language(s) of written
legal texts will differ from the legal jargon of legal practitioners, even though
they would naturally be mutually reinforcing. The jargon of legal practition-
ers stems from the language of legal texts and in turn this jargon takes roots
in legal writing, possibly making its way not only to the texts of judicial
decisions or court motions but also to the normative texts themselves.3
Legal language is a language and all languages constitute a community
(White, 1981–1982). The relationship between a language and a community
has been well explored, mostly by linguistics and linguistic anthropology.
These theories may be used in order to better understand the community
legal language constitutes.
Linguistics makes use of the concept of a speech community as a group of
persons sharing common code and common rules and expectations of use of
that code (Yule, 2017, p. 910). They are said to “develop through prolonged
interaction among those who operate within these shared and recognized be-
liefs and value systems regarding forms and styles of communication” (Mor-
gan, 2014, p. 1). Naturally, a typical example of a speech community is one
that shares a common language: a group of persons speaking English may
be considered members of an English-speaking speech community, French
speaking persons may be considered to be members of a French-speaking
speech community. However, this term may be used in a more complex man-
ner, since a speech community is not a fixed group, nor does it have clear
delimitations. Neither may it be delimited solely by the use of language.
As Labov pointed out “[it] is not defined by any marked agreement in the
use of language elements, so much as by participation in a set of shared
norms: these norms may be observed in overt types of evaluative behavior,
and by the uniformity of abstract patterns of variation which are invariant
in respect to particular levels of usage” (1972, p. 120–121).
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This participation therefore manifests in behaviour and in actual code
use. Even though the use of language is what creates the community and
sustains it over time, the community itself acquires qualities that do not have
to be considered solely language-based. In this sense, a speech community
may be understood as a community of practice (Wenger, 1998). A com-
munity of practitioners of a profession is a type of community of practice.
But a specific type of practice that is mainly a practice of specific discourse
(Mellinkoff, 1963, p. vi). To participate successfully in this community, one
must become a competent user of this discourse.
As any other language, we may say that legal language constitutes
a community. The language of law (or lawyers as a special professional com-
munity) as a shared code of communication is capable of constituting bonds
between individuals and a community and, naturally, between members of
a community (Mattila, 2006, p. 52). The language of legal norms, legal texts
and legal practice is, of course, not a natural one, even though it stems
from it, but it is language whose use must be taught through comprehen-
sive training. Not exactly by practicing a whole new vocabulary or syntax,
or by learning only specialized vocabulary; legal language is so intertwined
with law itself that to understand legal language properly we must know
the system of law as a whole, because in law, the normative consequences of
legal text cannot be simply read from its surface (Myška et. al., 2012). One
has to know the relevant context and be able to recognize what the relevant
context is.
Should we accept the approach that law and legal language are intrinsi-
cally and existentially bound together, legal language and law are two sides
of the same coin (Myška et. al., 2012) and, therefore, law is language sui
generis (White, 1985, p. xiii), so law itself could be understood as a soci-
olinguistically delimited speech community (Goodrich, 1984, p. 173) and,
along these lines, we may then theorize that legal language constitutes the
community of law.
Language use in a practice and speech community implies a cultural
and social context, possibly one that provides the speakers with knowl-
edge, interpretive tools and pre-understanding that allows them to fully
understand what is being communicated: through interpretation of the text
in a specific way (Fish, 1976, p. 465–485). This consideration is what we un-
derstand as an interpretive community. This concept was developed by Fish,
who assumed that language (a text) “does not have a shape independent
of context” (Fish, 1980, p. 268) and only within this context assumptions
of meaning of that language are formed. This context has social and cul-
tural character. For Fish, meaning is not a production of the text or the
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reader but rather of communities of “those who share interpretive strate-
gies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their properties”
(Fish, 1980, p. 14).
This approach may be understood in such a way that a specific code
acquires a specific meaning only within a specific cultural context. In our
enquiry, this context is provided by a professional community of lawyers:
as a group of persons educated and trained to work within specific area
of expertise, their main object of focus is legal text. Legal text may take
many forms, from the normative text of constitutions or statutory regula-
tions, through judicial and administrative decisions to texts of claims, court
motions, etc.
As language becomes an engine fuelling a person’s participation in
a given speech community, their communicative competence (“the knowl-
edge a speaker must have to function as a member of a social group” (Dell
Hymes, 1972, p. 269–293)) becomes crucial.
We have been talking about the ways how legal language represents
a specific functional variety of natural language to achieve the main func-
tion of regulating a society and that since it is a language of a kind, it is
capable of creating a community of its speakers. We have shown above that
to become a speaker of legal language requires training. Therefore, such
considerations imply that there must also be a group of non-speakers. The
issue of incomprehensibility of the law because of the incomprehensibility of
the legal language it uses, has been a long-debated topic. From the widely-
cited Mellinkoff’s critique of legal English (1963, 2004) and subsequent plain
language campaigns to individual studies on the nature and comprehen-
sibility of other legal languages to laypersons (Mattila, 2006; Cao, 2007;
Tiersma, 1999), various authors discuss and criticize various aspects of com-
munication of law to its addressees (Stevenson, 2003). The issue of (non)
comprehensibility of legal language has reached such a level, that many
jurisdictions choose to prepare summaries or explanations of the law in sim-
plified language (Mattila, 2006). But if such a communicative step is deemed
necessary, it means that the language of normative texts fails to fulfil its
function as a means of transmitting legal messages to all those that may be
required to follow them. Or, and that is the core of the issue we examine
here, it does not transmit the message to everyone but only to those who
speak the language.
Goodrich points out that the notion of legal language itself as a special
variety of language that is different from the way people usually talk to one
another, is itself a product of a society where only a set of legally compe-
tent persons are capable of understanding and reading legal texts (Goodrich,
52 Brought to you by | Masaryk University Brno
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/17/20 8:59 AM
Law for elites
1984, p. 534). Legal language is for him a “unity to be understood as the
social image of the argot or language of elite or professionalised power;
it is the language of authority, which takes the discursive form of mono-
logue, distance (temporal and hierarchical), and specialisation” (Goodrich,
1984, p. 185–187).
A reader implied by the text: An elite
To tackle the issue of comprehensibility of normative texts of any kind4
to those without formal legal training, authors have been asking what kind
of reader, what competencies and knowledge does it actually require to
understand it. White, as one of those who understand law as a kind of
language, points out that any text implies a specific type of a reader whose
knowledge and competence will make them ideally suited to understand
that text (White, 1981–1982, p. 427). To understand such a text, one must
become this ideal reader (Smejkalová, 2013).
We have suggested above that to understand the words and sentences
used in a piece of legal text and to understand that legal texts with all its
normative consequences are two different things. The distance between the
two is partially dependent on the individual language. While legal English
has been receiving a lot of criticism and seems to be undergoing changes
in that respect, legal Czech has been given little if any attention. Knapp
claimed that even persons without formal legal training seem to understand
the language of legal norms (1988). Others, however, point out that this does
not imply they understand the true context in which those legal norms make
sense (Smejkalová, 2013, p. 447–472). Hoecke points out that the “normative
character of the law requires that the interpretation of legislation is not
limited to the prima facie receiver-meaning” (2002, p. 131).
It follows that even a superficially comprehensible normative text re-
quires knowledge that cannot be obtained from the text alone; the ideal
reader that is implied by the legal text is not constructed by that text.
The legal text itself assumes a constitutive role: if we want to under-
stand it we must become the ideal reader. If a text presupposes a complex
competence that is not a part of general education, it means that it will
remain inaccessible to all those lacking this competence. It is the text itself
that actively constructs an image of its ideal reader; and the lay reader is not
them. As Smejkalová and Škop point out “[s]hould the author (or the text)
truly construct the reader and in the process of her construction rely on
factors external to the legal text, the legal text becomes an elitist message
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accessible only to some recipients, but perhaps not to those addressees who
are expected to make use of the law and behave accordingly” (2017, p. 65).
Given the nature of the normative text as a primary means by which regula-
tion of the society occurs, this latent activity of construction on the part of
the text is creating an elite (consisting of real readers of such text, capable
of reading and interpreting it within its relevant context).
Traditionally, an elite is understood as a group that holds a certain
amount of power in a society and uses it to influence its processes (Frič, 2008,
p. 85). Thinking of lawyers as an elite has a special dimension since law
itself creates power and ultimately represents power in a society. Naturally,
different elites command different types of power and the type of power
depends on the type of capital an elite has at its disposal.
Bourdieu defines capital as an “accumulated labor (in its materialized
form or its ‘incorporated’, embodied form) which, when appropriated on
a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to
appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor” (2011, p. 81).
He explains it as “a vis insita, a force inscribed in objective or subjective
structures, but it is also a lex insita, the principle underlying the immanent
regularities of the social world” (2011, p. 81). He further states that “capital
can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutional-
ized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible,
on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in
the forms of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of so-
cial obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions,
into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of
nobility” (2011, p. 82).
In different contexts and different situations one can find different types
of capital. The most usual and typical are economic capital, cultural capital
and social capital.
Economic capital is the most obvious and clear of the three. It consists
of all financial assets owned by an individual or an organization. Of course,
even the question of economic capital is more complicated but for the pur-
pose of this paper we may understand it simply as an economic power.
Cultural capital is a more complex matter. It exists in three vari-
ants: embodied, objectified and institutionalized. The first one means “long-
lasting dispositions of the mind and body” (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 82), the sec-
ond is cultural goods and the third marks for example educational qualifica-
tions. All three types are naturally interconnected and acquiring one usually
means a necessity of another type of cultural capital. However, the charac-
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ter and direction of such connection is often unclear. Embodied cultural
capital constructs a habitus, an integral part of one’s behaviour, a long-
term strategy of acting in life (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 82–88), including the use
of language.
Habitus is a way of behaviour which is taught “by the way,” it becomes
an integral part of one’s way of life, a pattern of reacting to various situa-
tions. Habitus is gained or cultured during upbringing, during socialization
and seems so natural that it can hardly be consciously taught later in life.
Habitus is a result of living with a certain amount of cultural capital. It can
be partly hereditary and partly needs time to be built in a process which
is often unconscious because it takes place, e.g., in family life or in another
social group during socialization and, e.g., by learning by imitation or in
another form not easily found and achieved. Cultural capital creates a cul-
tural competence and the logic of its transmission is based on inequality
because it cannot be controlled from outside (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 82–88).
Social capital consists of a network of connections or relationships in
a society and is fluid and always changing in time. According to Bourdieu, it
is “the product of an endless effort at institution, of which institution rites
– often wrongly described as rites of passage – mark the essential moments
and which is necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful
relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits” (2011, p. 87).
It can be individual or collective and consciously or unconsciously used both
in the short or long term. Resulting obligations may be subjectively felt or
institutionally guaranteed through consecration, which means “the symbolic
constitution produced by social institution” (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 87). Bour-
dieu explains that exchange of gifts strengthens a group and by recognition
of it reproduces the group itself and reaffirms the limits of the group. One
can imagine it as exchanging gifts, meeting for meals, attending cultural
events etc. (2011, p. 87).
In the context of our paper, we understand legal language to be a spe-
cial type of capital, either a part of cultural capital that is being acquired
through cultivation and training throughout formal legal education, and
indirectly a part of social capital when speaking not about the language
of normative legal texts but about the language of lawyers, a jargon, as
a means of intra-community communication.
It is quite clear how cultural capital in the form of knowledge of the lan-
guage of normative texts can become a means of power. Legal language (the
language of normative texts) is the language of power, Mattila says, there-
fore, it is often categorical. Especially when it comes to normative texts,
it does not explain, it does not persuade (Mattila, 2006, p. 45). Legisla-
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tion is a type of communication though which a legal change comes about
(Hoecke, 2002, p. 130), thus the language of the outcomes of legislation –
the normative texts – is full of commands. Through this, the language has
a character of expression of “pre-emptory power” (Mattila, 2006, p. 45).
Legislation is created within the enactment of power relations: the legis-
lator one-sidedly imposes rights and obligations upon the subjects of law.
There are no doubts about the fact that the promulgation of legislation is
an act of power (Hoecke, 2002, p. 130).
To have an elite who understands the language of power better than
others in this sense may seem inevitable. But if we realize that “[l]anguage
ideologies are complex and textured in that, as cultural beliefs and prac-
tices, they are reproductions and representations, as well as tools to exam-
ine, reflect, subvert and exalt those representations” (Morgan, 2014, p. 14),
reproducing rules and practices of use of that language may not just serve
the “proper” communication of law, but also it may strengthen the power
stance of a group who wields this particular type of power capital.
Law symbolically consecrates, as Bourdieu calls it – “by recording it
in a form which renders it both eternal and universal – the structure
of the power relation between groups and classes which is produced and
guaranteed practically by the functioning of these mechanisms” (Bourdieu,
1991, p. 188).
In power relations, specialized language may be understood as a very
useful part of exercising such a power. As Heinze put it, “[l]anguage’s de-
ceptively benign power becomes all the more lethal when it assumes the
guise of cultivated, specialist knowledge and professionalized technique”
(2012, p. 204). Foucault (1994) also addressed the proliferation of special-
ized discourse under the oversight of professional elites as a tool of social
control.
Yet, according to Pareto, elites are necessary in every society and history
is nothing more than a circulation of various elites coming into power and
declining from it. The existence of an elite (in our context a legal language
competent group) is not a good or bad thing, but a natural necessity and
stating there is one is a description of a society, not a criticism. In this
perspective, only an elite can govern a society because a mass is unable to
form a structure with enough will, energy or competence to manage it.
However, both an elite and a mass contain in some ways elements of
superior and inferior nature. For an elite to survive it should ideally be flex-
ible and open enough to strengthen its superior elements and weaken the
inferior ones. Thus, it should be able to attract persons from the mass with
the capacity to lead to become members of this elite instead of mobilizing
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a mass: it effectually makes sure any persons with superior leadership abil-
ities are members of an elite, instead of leading the mass. Yet an elite is
naturally closed to outsiders because it is exclusive. But unless it opens it-
self to outsiders, it will cease to exist. The outcome of all this is a circulation
of elites in time (Pareto, 1991).
Keller (2011) states that nowadays (besides a so-called discreet elite
with vast holdings) elites usually consist of professionals and managers of
corporations. He calls them a “helping elite”. Lawyers can be considered
a part of this category of elite. In contrast to discreet elite members, the
helping elite have no security of position since they can lose their post at any
time and with it their elite status. In addition, they are in competition with
one another, they have to actively pursue maintaining their status (whereas
the members of discreet elite do not) and their helping elite status does
not grant them financial security. Therefore, it is understandable that they
would try to secure their position.
This is not to say that lawyers, as an elite, would intend to lead a whole
society politically; there is no evidence to suggest that they would aspire
to decide for a society in all matters. We have enough examples from the
past to know how terribly it can end (Clark, 2000). Nevertheless, whether
consciously or unconsciously, they may effectively be guarding access to law
through their knowledge of how to use it, that is through their competence
in legal language. One of the best depictions of such approach to law is
a part of Franz Kafka’s Process called ‘Before the Law’ (2017). In this short
tale, a gatekeeper denies a villager access to law for so long that the villager
dies without ever seeing the law. It is an excellent metaphor for our purposes
because this story says nothing about law, its quality or any quality of its
application. We do not know if the villager would think better or worse
of law without really seeing it. If lawyers create an elite for the purpose
of acquiring power or accumulating it and their tool to do it is their legal
knowledge, it makes sense that they would do their best to minimize access
to law for outsiders. But if their purpose is to make law work in the best
way possible and a high level of legal awareness in society is a condition
for higher effectiveness of law, they should open the door to law as wide
as possible.
There are usually more elites than one in a society. There are differ-
ent elites wielding different types of power based on their capital. Lawyers
have a big social capital in a society just because they are lawyers (Dezalay
& Garth, 1997, p. 109–141). In popular culture, lawyers are usually por-
trayed as people with connections, money and exceptional knowledge of law
(Friedman, 2017, p. 3–30). If this is true, it means they have economic, so-
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cial and cultural capital in abundance purely as a result of their occupation.
Of course, such a portrayal is not always accurate, but still it is a picture of
how the rest of the society sees them. However, they understand law better
than a layperson, so they have more cultural capital and wield more power
accordingly.
But does it mean that legal language used in normative texts and by
lawyers needs to be (or should be) incomprehensible to laypersons as ad-
dressees of rights and obligations encoded in such normative texts? Steven-
son (2005) comes to the conclusion that normative texts are not intended
for laypersons, even though they seem to be the primary addressees of the
therein encoded rules (rights and obligations). If legal texts are drafted in
a language with such specific qualities that it takes a university-level educa-
tion to understand them, what is such a situation capable of communicating
about the whole system?5 Therefore, it would seem that requiring specialist
help from lawyers when it comes to understanding and navigating the law
is an inevitable part of what law is in a current society.
To support the idea of legal language having an elitist nature might
serve also Mattila’s remark on the fact that the problem of comprehen-
sibility of law (legal language) does not seem to be a problem when it
comes of lawyers: “Where a legal text is intended for use only between
lawyers, the requirement of understandability is less emphasized than would
be the case for texts intended for reading by the general public” (Mattila,
2006, p. 35–36).
Yet, in general discourse, lawyers as a group, or an elite, are not usually
viewed in the most positive light. The idea that lawyers hold such a special
power is not generally appealing. Why else would a famous Shakespearean
quote “Let’s kill all the lawyers” (Shakespeare, 1999) be cited so often both
in legal texts and in a popular culture (Kornstein, 2005).
Methodology and analysis
For the purpose of the project we referred to above, we have conducted
semi-structured interviews with the aim to map out the process of drafting
a legal text. Our approach here is one of qualitative research, which means
that we cannot generalize our conclusions. We do, however, use the responses
we were given for closer analysis of the specifics of the community of lawyers,
or more specifically, drafters of normative texts.
The interviews were divided into two parts. In the first part, we aimed
to map out the process of writing itself. In the second part, the interview
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was structured around a practical exercise, aiming to explore to what ex-
tent do the interviewees tend to draw on their knowledge of rules of in-
terpretation of legal texts. The first part of the interview was divided into
five thematic fields. We asked about the work of drafting a normative text
in general, the process of such a work, the practical aspects of writing,
the influence of other elements on their work (superiors, colleagues, for-
mal guidance documents etc.) and the respondents’ relationships to their
work. In the second part, we have prepared a set of normative texts that
might contain more or less obvious breaches of formal guidance and rules,
inconsistencies, or were simply pieces that allow for more than one way of
interpretation.
The respondents were chosen from experts with practical experience
in drafting statutes, usually in state administration, mostly as employees
in specialized “legislative departments” (read “departments specialized in
legislation drafting”). They come from the Ministry of Education and Youth,
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Justice of the
Czech Republic and the National Cyber and Information Security Agency,
and represent different levels of experience.
Conducting interviews allows for gaining a deeper insight into the ex-
perience of the respondents while letting them not only to answer our ques-
tions but also to open topics that they find important and that we might
not think of in advance (Kvale 1994). This was especially proven in the topic
that we address in this paper. While we might have suspected that certain
unwritten rules shape the normative texts and the process of their writing,
it was through these interviews with persons actively involved in the draft-
ing of normative texts that we were able to confirm their existence and gain
further insight on the community of drafters.
For the purpose of this paper, we have initially analyzed nine of the
interviews.6 Full transcripts of them were examined for repetitive patterns
related to references to the sources from where the respondents draw their
knowledge on how normative texts should be drafted, where to look for
specific rules, how to react to situations where it is not clear how a particular
piece of text should be formulated, or to whom the text is supposed to be
understandable.
Therefore, we analyzed the responses related to the rules and guid-
ance available when drafting normative texts, including testing the practical
knowledge contained in one of the most relevant “rulebooks” – the Legisla-
tive Rules of the Government, and the responses related to the intended
addressee of the drafted text and their conclusions regarding the compre-
hensibility of normative texts to persons without formal legal training.
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The rules of drafting specified in the Legislative Rules of the Govern-
ment (LRG) seem to play a crucial role in the drafting of legal texts. The par-
ticipants consistently pointed to them, claiming (as one participant put it)
that they “ensure the minimal guaranteed level of clarity, comprehensibility
and inner consistency and coherence”.
Although one of the participants claims that the LRG provides all the
rules he needs when drafting a legislative text (Participant 1), for others
this particular document does not contain answers to all drafting questions
that arise, and these gaps tend to be filled in by less official rulebooks and
other written guidance, or by “established and recognized practice”. One
of the participants does not rule out that these gaps naturally tend to be
filled in in an ad hoc manner, regardless of what the Legislative Rules of
the Government state.
The Legislative Rules of Government themselves must be interpreted. They are
in many ways vague and do not provide answers to all the questions, there are
white spots that must be filled in. By an established, accepted and unwritten
practice, or a completely new solution must be created, regardless of what the
Legislative Rules of Government say. [...] the principles are expressed vaguely
and every person can understand them in a different manner. Even when the
principle is expressed [in the LRG] it does not guarantee that the result will
fit the needs. (Participant 2)7
This claim seems to be proven by another participant (Participant 3)
who described a situation wherein she, with others, were trying to solve
a drafting problem not covered by the LRG but where the generally accepted
practice seemed to prefer a solution they deemed nonsensical. In the end,
they collectively chose her solution over the established practice and no-one
disputed it. They argued that their solution would be more favourable to
the future addressees of that normative text.
When asking participants about the intended addressees of their texts,
we aimed to find out whether – or to what extent – they take into account
the fact that their texts might be read by persons without formal legal
training. The participants typically answered that they do not write for
a specific type of addressee. They believe that a text following the drafting
rules (as set out in the LRG) would be sufficiently clear and comprehensible,
but accepted that in reality this is not always the case:
... I generally draft for an average person with an average intellect, so that
with a little luck they will understand it. But this is not always possible.
(Participant 6)
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[The text]... should work even from the point of view of an average individual
that could interpret the text. (Participant 4)
They do admit, however, that various normative texts are expected to
be read by different addressees. One of the participants pointed out that
the rules on family law would likely be read by a much wider audience than
the rules on sailing:
Of course it is also a matter of social sphere. If the legal regulation we draft
is a matter of family law, such regulation should be more comprehensible and
accessible than the regulation of sweetwater sailing. (Participant 2)
Only one participant explained that in their thematic area of work, they
have a very precise idea about the future reader of the normative texts they
draft and that they do not address their normative texts to average persons:
...in our area of expertise, we do not aim to regulate any common person. We
aim at very concrete subjects. Not natural persons, but legal persons, legal en-
tities. So we have a clear idea about who is supposed to be the addressee of that
regulation and we try to see the regulation through their eyes. (Participant 6)
Such answers seem to suggest that normative texts might differ in terms
of comprehensibility for different audiences. However, the answers also point
to how the recipients perceive their work; not as directed towards a partic-
ular addressee, rather as doing their work well, drafting an objectively good
(clear, comprehensible) text. One participant referred to the drafter’s work
as something having an objective result: if the text is comprehensible and
clear and free of errors, it makes a good normative text (Participant 2).
Škop and Vacková, interpret this response in such a way that mechanical
adherence to a formal standard of drafting makes a good (comprehensi-
ble and clear) text (2019, p. 23). In this respect, one of the participants
(Participant 1) went so far as to described themselves as a tool.
Yet the participants do not seem to agree on what it means exactly for
the text to be comprehensible. As shown above, they believe that in general,
they are creating texts that are understandable to “average persons”. They
do seem to imply, however, that the ability to understand the normative
text is a competence one needs to learn (Škop and Vacková, 2019, p. 22),
in this sense, they recognize the need to become a competent speaker of the
language of normative texts. This “learning”, however, is not meant as some
sort of formal training but rather an experience passed along by superiors
and colleagues.
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One of the respondents (Participant 3) talks about a certain intuition
when it comes to practically formulating normative texts, guided by an
experience of what kind of texts make it through one specific body that
reviews every draft normative text being created on the level of government,
or individual ministries.8
I think it is very intuitive, but also influenced by the Legislative Rules of
Government. [Others kept pointing out that] we cannot do it in such and
such a way, because it would mean adding a seventh paragraph into a section
and that would mean that the Legislative Council of Government would send
it back to us; or we cannot do it like that because the Legislative Council
would not like it done that way... There is some metaphysical corrective of
what passes through the Legislative council and what is being known that the
Council would tend to send back and say ‘Not this way’. Maybe in practice,
rather than referring to the Legislative Rules of Government [...] you keep
thinking about what would the Legislative Council of Government say.
The intuition regarding the preferences of the Legislative Council of Govern-
ment is what is guiding the formulation of normative texts. This experience,
however, is often not personal and direct but mediated by senior colleagues.
But it is not clear if these senior colleagues do have the personal experi-
ence or if they just pass on the unwritten sentiment they experience from
colleagues senior to them.
I think that it depends on where you come to, what is your first experience with
legislative drafting. It also depends on who your more experienced superiors
are [...] When I needed help, when drafting something, I would always go and
ask them. (Participant 4)
As one of the respondents in our research put it: “Legislature is a so-
cial competence that you cannot learn. It is an experience that is built on
establishing social links” (Participant 9), therefore one needs to acquire the
necessary communicative competence that is needed to be a full member of
the social group of legislative drafters (cf. Dell Hymes, 1972, p. 269–293).
Throughout the interviews, regardless of a particular question, we have
been given an answer along the lines of “this is how it’s supposed to be”.
When further questioned, the respondent was usually unable to give a de-
tailed answer and basically referred to some sort of experience through which
they learned about that practice or expectations. They seem to be function-
ing within a very specific community of practice, reproducing in their work
the patterns they learn from the experience they gain through prolonged
interaction with other legislative drafters with whom they share a certain
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understanding regarding what the form and style of communication (i.e. how
to draft normative texts) should be (cf. Morgan, 2014, p. 1 on the basic
characteristics of a speech community).
The participants’ answers seem to consistently show (as also shown by
Škop, 2018) that the final form of the normative text is shaped by rules that
do not necessarily come from any formally enacted document, but rather
from customs, passed along by their superiors or colleagues, or in the form
of other types of experience (such as when a text containing “an error” gets
returned to them from various actors in the legislative process).
Nevertheless, Škop and Vacková show that “it is very difficult, if not im-
possible, to identify an approach that characterizes law-making as a purely
mechanical activity that is a purely formalistic without any relevant creative
elements” (2019, p. 17).
It is clear from our interviews that at least in part the knowledge and
skill involved in the drafting of legal texts is acquired as a learned ignorance
in much the same way as most other specialized professions. This learned
ignorance is a characteristic of a speech community which as any other com-
munity that has its own rituals and its own language often becomes. The
legal language speech community has the status of an elite because it has
a special type of capital at its disposal: the capital of legal language compe-
tence. Because of this advantage, members of this elite may prefer to secure
their position by making it more difficult for outsiders to become a part
of this elite. Using legal language based on learned ignorance without any
actual knowledge of how to flexibly solve a dilemma between legal accuracy
and comprehensibility of legal texts (or even to recognize the dilemma), may
serve as such hardship.
However, Bourdieu explains that the laws of the transmission of such
capital are a particular case of the laws of the legitimate transmission of
cultural capital and are measured by academic criteria, on the level of ed-
ucation and on the social trajectory (1991, p. 61). It means that learning
the skill and craft of legislation drafting from one’s superiors and colleagues
is not necessarily wrong if it is accompanied by an actual knowledge of its
principles. An inequality is created naturally because as Bourdieu explains,
“...the social mechanisms of cultural transmission tend to reproduce the
structural disparity between the very unequal of the legitimate language
and the much more uniform knowledge of this language” (1991, p. 63).
Moreover, one has to take into account the role of law schools, because
“(T)he specialized languages that schools of specialists produce and repro-
duce through the systematic alteration of the common language are, as with
all discourses, the product of a compromise between an expressive interest
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and a censorship constituted by the very structure of the field in which the
discourse is produced and circulates” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 137).
Discussion and Conclusion
Bourdieu claims that “(t)hough equally free, human beings are unequal
in their ability to use their freedom authentically and only an ‘elite’ can
appropriate the opportunities which are universally available for acceding
to the freedom of the ‘elite”’ (1991, p. 149). Our findings indicate that the
possibility of understanding law through legal language used in legal texts
is not equal for everyone because it requires additional legal knowledge.
However, it does not mean that this inequality is always created by drafters
of legal texts as a result of their learned ignorance. It can sometimes (and
often does) mean that an ideal reader of such legal text is a lawyer with the
necessary legal expertise.
But is such a situation acceptable? Smejkalová and Škop discuss to
what extent may (and should) this ideal reader be a construct in the legal
text’s author’s head or be constructed by and through the text itself (2017).
They conclude by saying that the ideal outcome of drafting a legal text is
such a text that (or, in fact the actual author of that legal texts, such as
the drafter of that piece of legislation or a judge as an author of a judicial
decision) “constructs the text in such a way that the text is well capable of
education and forming the reader” (2017, p. 65).
However, we may theorize that lawyers are not really interested in law
becoming a democratic competence, because they would lose their purpose.
If it is lawyers themselves who are participating in the drafting of normative
texts in a manner that does not support the proper construction of their
readers (that is by providing lay readers with all the necessary information
to help them become a competent reader) they are reinforcing the idea that
lawyers are in fact a closed society that guards the knowledge of law. Thus,
should legal expertise – well recognized and mostly understood by the lay
society – be sufficient to secure the lawyers’ standing as an elite?
Bourdieu argues that cultural and sociological capital as an instrument
of power affects society significantly, legal language is and when a legal text
is written, it is a manifestation of power (1991). But if the resulting incom-
prehensibility of legal texts is beyond the framework of how law requires
accuracy, it is a misuse of power.9
Even if the process of re-creating and reinforcing of this legal speech
community as an elite may seem inherent (and maybe to some extent nat-
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ural), it still does not answer the question, if – in a democratic society – it
is acceptable for knowledge of law as basic rules of that society become and
elite social capital?
We could assume that an ideal lawyer would want their lay client to be
able to read the legal text so then they can talk about it together in order to
solve a legal problem. A layperson who fully understands the law at all times
without any help of a lawyer is utopia. Yet when drafting legislation we need
to take into account the layperson in order to ensure that they would be able
to understand the legal text on some sort of basic level. In terms of language
competence, at the very least the A1 level (which means mostly a passive
knowledge of language in common situations) (Council of Europe, 2001) in
legal language is necessary in order to be able to participate in legal matters.
The paradox of legal language as we have discussed it above is inherent
to law and as such it cannot be eliminated. In consequence, it would be
näıve to believe that there might be a moment in time when we will not
need a group of specialists with legal expertise who would understand law
better than the rest. These people (usually lawyers) hold the power of legal
knowledge, which makes them a part of elite. The existence of an elite is
not in itself negative; however, a properly functioning elite must be open,
and accepting, when it comes to new members bringing with them enriching
capital.
Passive knowledge of legal language is sufficient to participate in every-
day situations and choosing a member of an elite to represent the layperson’s
interests in more complex situations does not need to be understood as com-
pletely unacceptable. While a layperson should be able to understand the
most basic of rules (such as the civil code) and use it in everyday life, in
more complicated matters, where an active knowledge of law is necessary,
such as buying a company or applying for asylum, it is both normal and
necessary to seek the professional advice of a lawyer to represent them. Is
such a “representative” law in collision with the principle of democracy?
Most democratic states have a representative democracy. Representative
law works similarly. Therefore, if the principle of representation is accept-
able for democracy, it is the least of our problems when it comes to legal
language.
N O T E S
1 There are, of course, various approaches to define and delimit law. However, the dif-
ferences between these approaches are not relevant to this paper. In this paper – and in
the research we refer to later on – we focus solely on normative texts, i.e. texts of legal
regulations, which are (at least in civil law countries) a necessary part of law. We choose
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not to differentiate between various kinds of normative texts, because such differentiation
does not directly influence our line of argumentation. We focus instead on lawyers as
a community, one that may be united by the language it masters, or by the practice it
shares, and we are approaching legal language (the language in which the normative texts
are written) as a tool that shapes and re-creates such a community.
2 This article is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation
(GAČR), grant no. GA17-14903S – “Methodology of empirical research on usage of in-
terpretative methods in law-making”.
3 Thus, one can presume that there is a special (implicit) kind of communication between
normative texts and judicial decisions about legal language. It goes both ways and the
meaning of law communicated in those texts can be very different depending on the role of
judges in different legal systems. For closer considerations on the mutual communication
between the legislature and the judiciary through judicial interpretation of normative texts
see Smejkalová, T. (2013) Soudnictv́ı, jeho povaha a role v právńım systému ČR. Disertačńı
práce, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University, p. 13, p. 140 ff., p. 171ff. and p. 235–236.
We do not, however, address in any way this special dimension of communication. While we
admit that the jargon of legislation drafters, defence attorneys or judges might naturally
differ, all these groups will share an essential common competence: understanding the
normative text, a competence that a layperson will probably lack. As specified above, in
our considerations we do not assess this competence among judges or defence attorneys;
our object of interest strictly involves those actively engaged in drafting legislative texts.
4 For this line of argumentation it is not necessary to differ among various types of
legal regulation, neither between substantive and procedural regulations. Not only does
one regulation often contain rules of both, substantive and procedural nature, but also
without understanding the processes one has at hand, understanding substantive rules
only does not make them a competent user of law.
5 What an element of a system looks like is capable of communicating a piece of infor-
mation about the system as a whole. In law, this approach was used e.g. by Lasser (1994),
who approached judicial decisions as self-portraits of the judiciary (or, in consequence)
whole legal system, because individual formal as well as material aspects of judicial de-
cisions inevitably reflect basic principles the system is based on. This approach was also
used by Smejkalová (2013).
6 This research is ongoing. Not all intended data have been gathered and accordingly
final results have yet to be published.
7 This quotation, along with all subsequent quotations from the interviews were trans-
lated from the original transcripts by the authors of this paper.
8 This body is the so called Legislative Council of the Government. Its task is to review
draft laws before they are approved by the government. They review it from the point of
view of consistency with the rest of the legal system, but they also review the text from the
point of view of explicit drafting rules as specified in the Legislative Rules of Government.
9 Legal linguistics has long shown how petrification of ancient legal formulae actually
adds to incomprehensibility not only of normative texts to anyone without formal legal
training (see Mellinkoff, 1963, Tiersma, 1999).
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